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Abstract 
E-crime has had various definitions for different countries and organizations. There is no 
universal definition of E-crime and therefore the interpretation is left to cybercrime 
investigators and judges to apply related crimes to within the scope where possible. 
E-crime legal brief should include Citation, facts of the case, issues, reasoning, decision 
of the judges and analysis. The analysis outlines applicable laws in e-crime, case laws 
relevant to the facts of the case and crime committed. The analysis either provide 
supporting or contrary opinions diverting from ruling and decision made by the judges. 
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1.0 Case overview and definition of e-crime 
It is an e-crime appeal case that involves hacking of TalkTalk Company leading to 
disclose of personal data, repeated attacks, online trade of obtained data, latency of its 
website and blackmail of the then Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Talktalk is a leading 
company that provides a range of broadband, telecommunication and network solutions 
services to various businesses across the UK. 
E-crime in most jurisdictions has been interchangeably equated to cybercrime and has 
had various definitions depending on different jurisdiction and investigation institutions. 
It’s for the benefit of this case that I explore various e-crime definitions and provide a 
definition that will be applied in the brief. 
1.1.1 The Association of Chief Police Officers under e-crime strategy 2009 manual 
(ACPO, 2009) defines e-crime as the use of networked computer or internet 
technology to commit or facilitate the commission of crime. 
1.1.2 Under its pronged approach to combat organized crimes, (United Nations, 
1994) in its manual on prevention and control of computer related crimes 
defined e-crime to include fraud, forgery and unauthorized access.  
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1.1.3 The UK parliament as per (Home affairs, 2013/2014) divides e-crime to: pure 
online crime where a digital system is the target as well as the means of 
attack, which include information technology infrastructure disruptions, data 
theft over network malware and includes also existing crimes that have 
transformed in scale or form by the use of the internet; (Stewart, 2006) or the 
use of internet to facilitate drug dealing, people smuggling and other 
traditional types of crimes. 
1.1.4 The legal dictionary (Stewart, 2006) refer to e-crime as a convenient name to 
describe some new crimes made possible by wider use availability of 
computer and the opportunities provided by the internet as well as some new 
ways of committing old crimes. 
1.1.5 (Begovic, 2017) defines e-crime as any criminal activity that involves the 
internet, computer or other device such as distribution in of distribution of 
electronic viruses, launching denial of service attack, fraud, harassment, 
copyright breaches and making, possessing or distributing objectionable 
material. 
1.1.6 According to (Yar, 2012) e-crime has been described the new patterns of 
vulnerability to criminal predation and harm resulting from transformation of 
mediated communication enabled by changing technologies.  
1.1.7 According (Gercke, 2012) describes e-crime as computer related crime that 
covers offences that are either related to a network or affect only stand-alone 
computer systems. 
1.1.8 E-crime (Malakedsuwan, 2019) has also been defined in the context of e-
fraud as a crime that affects society, impacting upon individuals, businesses 
and governments. 
1.1.9 (Stefan Fafinski, 2010) even though alludes that there is no legal definition, 
he refers to e-crime as a crime committed by means of or with the assistance 
of the use of electronic networks.  
1.1.10 E-crime according to (Computer Hope, 2019) is an act performed by a 
knowledgeable computer user who illegally browses or steals a company or 
individual information. 
 2 | P a g e  
 
1.1.11 E-crime in this legal brief will be referred to as any crime committed or aided 
by use of electronic operations targeting computer systems security, data 
processed by them, disruptions of IT infrastructure, possession/distributing 
information by means of a computer system or network. 
1.2 Computer hackers (Computer Hope, 2019) possess special skills in coding computer 
programming tools or exploit vulnerabilities in a specific target device or network for 
access of secured information leading to either altering or disrupting system and or 
security features of either the device or network. 
2.0 Case citation 
Re V. Connor Douglas Allsop 
2018/04878/A2 
United Kingdom, Court of Appeal Criminal Division 
30th January 2019 
[2019] EWCA Crim 95; [2019]1 WLUK 434 
Before: Lord Justice Flaux Mr Justice Sweeney and Mr Justice Soule 
3.0 Facts of the case 
3.1 It’s an appeal case for the sentence passed by a single Judge in a case that involved 
hacking into computer systems of a mobile phone communication company TalkTalk 
in October 2015. 
3.2 The appellant (Connor Douglas Allsop), 22 years of age at sentencing pleaded guilty 
on re-arraignment to count 6 “Supplying an article for use in fraud, contrary to section 
7(1) of the Act (Fraud Act, 2006) and count 8 Supplying articles for the use in an 
offence under sections 1, 3 or 3ZA of the Act (Computer Misuse Act, 1990)” 
3.3 Mathew Hanley, co-accused pleaded guilty to count 3 “Causing a computer to perform 
a function to secure or to enable unauthorized access to a program or data, contrary 
to section 1(1) of the Act (Computer Misuse Act, 1990) count 4 Supplying articles for 
use in an offence under sections 1, 3, or 3ZA of the Act (Computer Misuse Act, 1990) 
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count 5 supplying an article for use in fraud section 7(1) of the Act (Fraud Act, 2006) 
count 9 Obtaining articles for use in an offence under sections 1,3 or 3ZA of the Act 
(Computer Misuse Act, 1990)” 
3.4 The court initially had decided the two defendants should wait trial outcome of Daniel 
Kelly also charged with number of cases relating to TalkTalk hacking attack and 
blackmail, but after several adjournment of the case, (Westlaw , 2019) on 19th 
November 2018 at the Central Criminal Court the appellant was sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment on the two counts i.e. count 6 (eight months) and count 8 
(concurrent term of seven months imprisonment). 
3.5 BAE Systems was tasked to investigate the case after TalkTalk became aware of 
potential latency issues on its website as per (Westlaw , 2019), continued/repeated 
blackmail directed to then Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dido Harding for demands 
of bitcoins in exchange of data stolen, National Criminal Agency (NCA) were informed 
of the attack. 
3.6 The appellant and Hanley lived in Tamworth and knew each other, Hanley was a 
dedicated Computer hacker who according to (Westlaw , 2019) when he realized 
police were after him wiped his computer but fortunately police were able to obtain 
evidential information of his Skype conversation with the appellant detailing/admitting 
how he hacked to TalkTalk database and file exchange between the two.  
3.7 The appellant (Westlaw , 2019) supplied the dump file to online user referred to as 
‘Reign’ with full knowledge that Hanley and Reign were involved with fraud and 
hacking. The dump file consisted of personal and financial details of 8,000 TalkTalk 
customers. Reign later supplied the appellant with list of personal data and website 
details and passwords which he submitted to Hanley. The files were later used for 
further hacking. 
3.8 The appellant in is plea (Westlaw , 2019) admitted having not known the impact of his 
actions to the victims while Hanley said his actions were not money motivated and 
bemoaned to have done such an activity. 
3.9 Examination reports of the defendants brought to the Judges (Westlaw , 2019) 
assessed the appellant to be of low risk of offending and low risk of harm while Hanley 
was assessed to be of low risk to harm to others with probation officer considered him 
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to be a vulnerable within a custodial environment due to his history of anxiety and low 
self-esteem therefore non-custodial sentence was preferred. 
3.10 The judges in their sentencing remarks (Westlaw , 2019) noted that, both 
defendants were significantly involved in planning attacks of computer systems of 
TalkTalk Company, they also didn’t report the vulnerabilities in the company systems, 
further, the actions of the two lead along with others to gain access to the company 
confidential data that included customers information, causing loss of £77 million, 
supplied confidential information to others causing misery and distress to thousands.  
 
4.0 Issues 
4.1 The appellant (Westlaw , 2019) raised three grounds of appeal in relation to the 
sentence given by the lower court judge as shown below.  
4.1.1 First, (Westlaw , 2019) did the judge overstate the appellant’s involvement in 
taking part in the original hacking of TalkTalk database hence denying the 
appellant a lesser imprisonment by stating that the appellant was involved in 
a “significant sophisticated, systematic, planned attack”?  
4.1.2 Second, (Westlaw , 2019) did the judge distinguish sufficiently between the 
culpability of the two co-defendants, whereby unlike Hanley the appellant did 
not benefit from the attack hence raising the issue of culpability? The 
appellant submitted that his culpability was less than that of Hanley and that 
the one-third less starting point of 20 months, rather than 30 months in case 
of Hanley, did not reflect their respective culpability, capitulations which the 
appellant cannot agree by. 
4.1.3 Third, (Westlaw , 2019) did the judge err in not suspending the sentence? 
The appellant submitted to the court that, “it should consider the period of 
delay between plea of guilty and sentence as the prospect of a custodial 
sentence was hanging over the appellant, that since sentencing the appellant 
has been incarcerated in Belmarsh prison for 20 weeks a sufficient sentence 
to reflect the seriousness of the offending.” 
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5.0 Decision 
5.1 The court of appeal dismissed the plea but agreed to correct a technical defect in the 
sentencing issued by the lower court. While delivering their ruling on (R v Connor 
Douglas Allsopp, 2019) the Judge’s unanimously agreed that, “the only amendment 
we would make to the sentences passed is that they should have been sentences of 
detention in a young offender institution, rather than imprisonment, because at the 
date of his conviction on 30th March 2017 the appellant was under 21 years.” 
 
6.0 Reasoning 
6.1 On the first issue, (Westlaw , 2019) the court of appeal held that, “we agree that if 
the judge’s statement at the outset of her sentencing remarks that the appellant was 
involved in a significant, sophisticated, systematic, planned attack were taken in 
isolation, it might suggest that she had proceeded on the assumption that the 
appellant was involved to a greater extent than he was.” However, the appeal court 
asserted that careful consideration of facts taken into account is clear that there is no 
question of the judge having misunderstood the extent of the appellant’s involvement. 
6.2 On the second issue, (Westlaw , 2019) court of appeal agreed with the lower court 
and stated that, “the judge was right to put the appellant’s offending towards the 
bottom end of the medium culpability category in the guideline and her starting point 
of 20 months faithfully reflected that.” The appeal court judge’ also noted that the lower 
court took into considerations the appellants youth, immaturity and delay in sentencing 
by reducing starting point from 20 months to twelve months, giving appellant full one-
third credit after pleading guilty until four months after plea and case hearing and four 
months before trial which shows he was more generous. Therefore, the appeal court 
held that, (Westlaw , 2019) the sentence passed cannot be described as excessive, 
or disparity between appellant and Hanley.  
6.3 The third issue, (Westlaw , 2019) the appeal court stated that, “the judge took 
account of the delay in reducing the amount of the starting point and the issue in 
relation to whether or not she should have suspended the sentence is not one which 
is related to the delay but is related to the seriousness of the offending.” Further the 
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judges observed that the appellant did not initiate the attack but took advantage and 
facilitated fraudulent acts which could have affected a large number of victims. The 
issue of the lower court judge applying immediate custodial sentence was therefore 
appropriate. 
 
7.0 Opinion  
7.1 The court of appeal Judges agreed to the views of the single lower court judge in his 
decision during the initial sentencing. While delivering the ruling the Judge’s noted 
that, (Westlaw , 2019) the sentencing attributed to the inadequacy of sentencing 
guidelines for offences under Computer Misuse Act 1990, she however based her 
sentence to (R v Martin 2013) and (R v Mudd 2017) where she related the following; 
7.1.1 Referring to (R v Martin, 2013) case, “The offences fell into the highest level 
of culpability, mainly because of the financial loss and destruction to private 
and business affairs.” 
7.1.2 In (R v Mudd, 2017) case, the judge noted that, “The appellant in the case, 
who was aged 20, had no serious convictions and was diagnosed with 
Asperger’s Syndrome. The offence took place at age 16 and there was 
substantial mitigation. The court reduced the sentencing from six years for an 
adult to 24 months, the appeal court further reduced it to 21 months, but 
concluded that immediate custody was appropriate and said that it was 
important the courts sent clear message that cybercrime on this scale was 
not a game but would be taken very seriously by the courts and punished 
accordingly.” 
7.2 On count 5 and 6 the judge referred the offences to section 7 of the (Fraud Act, 2006), 
where he found the offending on the lower end of medium culpability. The judge noted 
that (Westlaw , 2019), the appellant involvement was less than Hanley, she also 
considered pre-sentence report including submissions before the court. She noted 
that the appellant was 18 years at the time and immature, that he had no previous 
convictions, that the period between the offending and sentence was not appellants 
fault.  
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7.2.1 This guided the judge in reducing the starting point from 20 months to 12 
months; he further was given full one-third credit due to his considerable 
admissions in police interviews. The judge therefore in this view issued a 
concurrent imprisonment sentence as follows, 8 months sentence on count 
6- and 7-months sentence on count 8. 
7.2.2 The judge also concluded that, she could not suspend the sentence in view 
of the seriousness of the offending. 
 
8.0 Analysis 
8.1 The case is interesting and has significant impact to cases related to e-crime as it’s 
among the cases that shocked the world on how young teenagers were able to 
compromise systems security of a big company.  
8.2 The intentions of the hacker determine if the actions contain mens rea (Westlaw , 
2019) if the hacker performs the following; decides to take the data to publish, 
blackmail legitimate owner with a threat of publishing the data, use the data to launch 
other attacks, duplicate the accessed database or does an illegal activity. 
8.3 Although the judges were candid in delivering their opinion based on the case, but I 
found it lacking depth in terms of other case laws for informed decisions and wider 
scope of passing stiffer punishment as a way of deterrence. 
8.4 Citing the definition of e-crime, facts of the case and submissions before the court, the 
following legislations were contravened; Computer Misuse Act 1990, The Frauds Act 
2006, Protection to Harassment Act 1997, Criminal Damage Act 1971 and Data 
Protection Act 1998.  
8.5 The act (Protection to Harassment Act, 1997) section 1 (1) a, b, (2) states that; “(1) a 
person must not pursue a course of conduct, (a) which amounts to harassment of 
another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other, 
(2) for the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question 
ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to 
harassment of the other.” 
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8.6 Additionally, the act (Protection to Harassment Act, 1997) Section 8 (1) a, b as stated; 
“every individual has a right to be free from harassment and, accordingly, a person 
must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another and, 
(a) is intended to amount to harassment of that person; or (b) occurs in circumstances 
where it would appear to a reasonable person that it would amount to harassment of 
that person.” 
8.7 Therefore based on the understanding from (Protection to Harassment Act, 1997), 
that harassment amounts to any action taken by an individual that may include 
alarming the person or causing the person distress and based on the facts of the case 
it’s clear that from his own admission the appellant had full knowledge of his actions 
which caused distress to TalkTalk CEO and customers as a result of repeated 
blackmail and therefore guilty of causing harassment.  
8.8 The reckless actions carried by both the co-accused also amounts to an offence under 
the act (Criminal Damage Act , 1971) section 1 (1); “a person who without lawful 
excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy 
or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would 
be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.” 
8.9 In the case of R v Whiteley 1991, (Casey, 2004) the court of appeal held that what the 
criminal damage act required to be proved was that tangible property had been 
damaged and not necessary that the damage itself should be tangible. 
8.10 While it may be challenging for the prosecution to proof in this case the accused 
acted intentionally, enough evidence based on admission interview exist to show that 
they acted recklessly. On his part the appellant offered to act as the link person 
between Hanley and online fraudsters with full knowledge the dump file contained 
customers personal details which were under custody of TalkTalk Company as one of 
their key assets for business operations. The company also reported potential website 
latency which was as a result of the hacking. 
8.11 Referring to the judge reasoning that the co-accused in (R v Connor Douglas 
Allsopp, 2019) “was involved in a significant, sophisticated, systematic, planned 
attack,” decision upheld by the appeal court, show the applicability of Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
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8.12 The (Data Protection Act, 1998) Section 55 (1); “A person must not knowingly or 
recklessly, without the consent of the data controller, (a) obtain or disclose personal 
data or the information contained in personal data, (b) procure the disclosure to 
another person of the information contained in personal data.” 
Therefore, careful analysis of the facts presented demonstrates clearly that the 
actions of the appellant and co-accused disclosed personal data and even went 
ahead to procure the disclosure of the data to online fraudsters leading to subsequent 
attacks, this therefore shows that the appellant committed an offence under Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
8.13 The issue of whether the evidence was enough raises the question of whether the 
court was right in sentencing the appellants based on the admission interview, data 
files and whatsapp conversation submitted in court. In the case of (Ellis v DPP, 2001), 
the judge while dismissing the appeal case on satisfactory of evidence noted that, “the 
statutory provisions were sufficiently wide to include the use made of the computers 
by E. The evidence of the university administrative officer and the police was sufficient 
to justify a finding that there was a case to answer and the justices had been entitled 
to infer that E had the necessary intent and knowledge. It was not necessary for the 
prosecution to adduce expert evidence in a case alleging computer misuse; it was 
sufficient to rely on the admissions made in interview and the factual evidence of the 
administrative officer involved.” 
8.14 The appeal claim case, (R v Connor Douglas Allsopp, 2019) the appellant pleaded 
that, although he knowingly participated in the “computer hacking” process by 
requesting for the dump file from Hanley and submitting it to online fraudster his 
actions were not severe and were driven by immaturity and desire to demonstrate 
dexterity to peers. The Judges were right to use the case of (R v Mudd, 2017) which 
demonstrates both considerate aspects of immaturity for young offenders whose 
desire to commit a crime is driven by the essence of showing their ability to peers, 
therefore taking into account the age of the offender while at the same time passing 
severe sentence is enough deterrence for any young cybercriminal with the same 
intentions or motives. 
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8.15 Further analysis of (R v Mudd, 2017) case and that of (R v Connor Douglas 
Allsopp, 2019) shows sharp similarity in the aspects of public interest, parties involved, 
defendants actions among other aspects as below; 
8.15.1 The cases were both appeal and were initially decided by a single judge at 
criminal magistrate court  
8.15.2 Among the counts the most predominant were (supplying an article for use in 
an offence contrary to section 1 or 3 of (Computer Misuse Act, 1990).  
8.15.3 The cases involved minors who were subjected to physiatrist test to 
determine their mental ability.  
8.15.4 Admitted having committed the crime.  
Therefore considering the decision of appeal court in (R v Mudd, 2017) to revise 
the sentence length from 24 months to 21 months persuaded the appeal court in 
(R v Connor Douglas Allsopp, 2019) to uphold the ruling of the junior court in line 
with the precedent set by the earlier case.  
8.16 On the issue of whether the case could have been suspended in lieu with the 
determination of blackmail case involving Daniel Kelly, accused of hacking into 
TalkTalk company, the court of appeal declined and sided with the Criminal court 
decision on (R v Connor Douglas Allsopp, 2019) that the delay of offending and trial 
should not be subjected to the two defendants. In my opinion however, two things 
arise; 
8.16.1 Did the actions of appellant and Hanley lead to blackmailing the then TalkTalk 
CEO? 
8.16.2 Were there any charges of blackmail preferred against the two together with 
Daniel Kelly and how will it affect the ruling/sentence? 
In view of the court of appeal horpeus corpus case of (Zezev v Governor of Brixton 
Prison, 2002) where the co-accused had sought an appeal on extradition to United 
States of America following accusation of compromising systems and blackmailing 
Mr Bloomberg, the appeal court dismissed the plea whereby in the ruling Mr Justice 
Wright held in part that, “Mr Zezev's at least apparent involvement, either in such 
conduct or in a conspiracy to be involved in such conduct, is plain on the evidence or 
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discloses a prima facie case for him to answer under section 3 of Computer Misuse 
Act 1990.” 
8.17 Interpreting the arguments in the above case, am persuaded to mention that 
although the actions of the appellant and Hanley were linked to the subsequent 
attacks which lead to blackmail and demands for bitcoin, the court did not prefer 
blackmail charges against them, which to my opinion the extent of their involvement 
in the blackmail ought to have been propped and criminal culpability established 
based on the evidence adduced before the court. This therefore would have warranted 
suspension of the sentence until hearing and determination of Daniel Kelly case. 
8.18 In conclusion I submit that the junior court was more concerned with expedited 
justice rather than considering comprehensive aspects of laws contravened and the 
decision by appeal court to uphold the sentencing did not cure the problem either way. 
While I agree partly with the appeal court, considering the limitations to the issues 
raised, the utmost concern is driven by the fact that suspension of sentence plea was 
not issued as that would have established in details the criminal capability of the 
appellant in the subsequent attacks and blackmail of TalkTalk CEO. 
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